Abstract. This paper characterizes collision preserving padding rules and provides variants of Merkle-Damgård (MD) which are having less or no overhead costs due to length. We first show that suffix-free property of padding rule is necessary as well as sufficient to preserve the collision security of MD hash function for an arbitrary domain {0, 1}
Introduction
Hash function has become an essential object in many cryptographic protocols [4] particularly in signature schemes [2, 6, 11] . It takes an input from a message space M (usually {0, 1} * or {0, 1}
for some s) and it outputs a t-bit string for a fixed t. The hash function plays role of preprocessor in many applications so that one can work with t-bit H(M ) instead of an arbitrary sized M , which essentially helps us to keep design of a protocol simple and efficient. In most cases, securities of these protocols rely on the collision resistance property (it is hard to find two different messages with same hash value) of the hash function. The most popular design of a hash function is Merkle-Damgård [5, 10] or MD hash function where a compression function f : {0, 1} b+t → {0, 1} t is designed first. Given a message, some additional bits may be padded to it so that it can be partitioned into several blocks of size b. The compression function is then sequentially applied to an initial value and to all blocks of the padded message. It seems difficult to design a hash function from scratch, based on only simple logical or/and arithmetical operations, which can provide absolute collision security (or provable collision security like discrete log based hash function [7] ). However, it is well known that the MD hash functions with length strengthening padding which includes length of the message, preserves collision security i.e. the hash function is collision resistant if so is the compression function. So we are able to at least transfer the infeasibility assumption of a hash function to a smaller domain compression function and hence only task remains to design a good compression function.
Padding rule is essential for MD hash function (proposed by both Damgård [5] and Merkle [10] independently in crypto-1989). However they used different padding rules. Merkle's padding rule can not handle arbitrary length messages. Sarkar [16] recently introduced a padding rule which can handle arbitrary messages and the number of padding bits is O(log |M | log * |M |) for some slowly growing function log * defined in [16] . This is asymptotically less that that of Damgård's padding rule where O(|M |) bits are padded. Note, if the size of padded bits is more, it may cost more invocations of the underlying compression function. So, in terms of efficiency of hash function, one should try to keep size of pad as small as possible. Any arbitrary padding may not be good as the hash function is desired to preserve collision security. Clearly, injectivity is a basic requirement of a padding rule. A padding rule is said to preserve collision security for MD if the MD hash function with this padding rule preserves collision security. So, it is worthwhile to characterize all padding rules preserving collision security. Our Contribution. In this paper, we first show that suffix-free property is both necessary and sufficient to preserve collision security for MD hash function. Damgård in [5] mentioned prefix-free padding rules. Stinson [17] , Bellare and Rogaway [3] mentioned suffix-free property while proving collision preserving of particular padding rules. Even though sufficiency of suffix-free padding rule seems intuitive, we do not know any paper proving it. Some observations on Merkle's padding rule can be found in [8] . On the other hand, the necessity of the suffix-free property is non-trivial. We propose a simple efficient suffix-free padding rule, padding O(log(|M |)) bits, which can handle arbitrary messages. We see a comparison of new padding rules with known padding rules in Table 1 .
Let a t-bit compression function f is collision resistant in the first (t − 1)-bits (i.e. collision resistant after chopping the last bit). We show that a simple variant of MD hash function (converting 0 t chaining value (if any) into 0 t−1 1) without any length-padding (any injective padding such as 10 d -padding works) is collision resistant. We actually prove a stronger statement which says that any collision of the new hash function reduces to either a collision of f or a collision of the first (t − 1) bits of f with the collision value 0 t−1 . Thus, we are able to remove overhead costs due to length.
We also provide an improved three property (collision, (2nd) preimage) preserving salted hash function which is a variant of MD hash function and is more efficient than recently proposed hash function [1] in terms of salt size. Organization of the paper. We first give an overview of the security notions of a hash function and padding rules of MD hash functions in section 2. In section 3, we characterize the collision preserving padding rules for any fixed initial value. We also have provided simple examples of padding rule in the same section. In the following section, we prove a simple variant can completely avoid length-padding and still have collision security under a reasonable additional assumption. In section 5, we study an improved variant of BCM (backward chaining mode) hash function which preserves all basic three security notions of a hash function.
Overview of MD Hash Function, Padding Rule
t is called a collision resistant [15, 18] hash functions if it is "hard" to find a collision pair (M, M ) i.e., M = M such that H(M ) = H(M ). We define collisionadvantage of an algorithm A as
where probability is calculated over the random coins of A. Informally, a hash function is called collision resistant if, for any efficient algorithm A, the collision advantage of A for H is negligible. Unfortunately, we can not rule out the existence of an efficient collision finding algorithm A outputting (M, M ) which is eventually a collision pair of the hash function H. But nobody may know or write down this algorithm based on our current knowledge. Therefore, we can say that a hash function is collision resistant if no efficient collision finding algorithm is known for it. Rogaway formalized this approach by introducing human ignorance model [14] . Keeping this in mind, we use the following definition of preserving properties of hash securities. Definition 1. A hash family H := {H IV } IV∈{0,1} t based on a compression function f is said to preserve ( , )-collision security if given an efficient algorithm A with at least collision advantage for H, we can construct (write down its code modulo the subroutine A) an efficient algorithm A with at least collision advantage for f . + for some message space M. We define the classical iterated function f
IV,pad is defined as the composition of the following maps:
). An illustration is given in figure 1 . Padding rule is essential to make the message size compatible with the domain of f + IV as well as to keep the hash function collision preserving. In this paper, we will mainly study padding rules of MD and its different variants. , the MD hash based on f using pad 0 padding rule. Moreover, the same result is true for any other "simply defined" padding rule which is not suffix-free (see Theorem 1 in section 3.3). 
Damgård's padding rule :
The message space for Damgård's padding rule is {0, 1} * . He used different padding rule pad damg which does not need to pad length of the message but it pads every message block by a single bit 0 or 1 depending on whether it is first block or not and finally, it pads one complete block representing the amount of 0-padding. More precisely,
One disadvantage of using Damgård's padding is that for large messages it is not as efficient as Merkle's length padding as it needs more number of padded bits. However, unlike pad merk , it can be applied to any arbitrary messages.
3. Sarkar's padding rule : Sarkar defined a new padding rule which can be applied to any tree based iteration which includes the classical sequential iteration. The padding rule is defined as
Note that, it can handle arbitrary messages and needs O(log(|M |) × log * (|M |)) many padded bits where log * is much slower function compare to log (see [16] for more details). It is straightforward to see that all these padding rules are suffix-free (we leave it for readers to verify). We provide a simple example of suffix-free padding rule pad length which needs O(log(|M |)) many bits. Basically, we apply Damgård's padding rule to the length of the message instead of applying it to the whole message. The precise definition of the padding rule can be found in section 3.2 and it is parameterized by a parameter s. Note that for any choice of s, the message space of this padding rule is {0, 1}
* . This padding is so far the most efficient padding rule (in terms of the number of padding bits) and if the message size is less than 2 63 then this padding rule with s = 64 is same as Merkle's padding rule. Therefore in practice, we can apply MD hash function as long as message size is less than 2 63 . In table 1, we make a comparison for all these padding rules with respect to message space M, length of the padded bits for a message M and how it preserves the collision security.
Characterization of Collision Preserving Padding Rules
In this section, we characterize all padding rules applied to MD hash function preserving the collision resistant property. We first show that suffix-free padding rule is sufficient to preserve collision resistant and then we provide some simple examples of suffix-free padding rules which are better than the known padding rules in terms of the padding size and the message space, in which padding rule can be applied. Finally, we show that suffix-free property is also necessary to preserve collision resistant property.
Sufficient condition of collision-preserving padding
For any f : {0, 1} b+t → {0, 1} t and h ∈ {0, 1} t we have defined the iterated function f
We can extend the definition to the domain ({0, 1} b ) * by defining f + h (λ) = h where λ is the empty bit string. It is easy to see that if
Now we provide basic intuitive lemma whose immediate corollary is that the suffix-free padding rule preserves collision resistant for MD hash function. The lemma says that if we have free-start collision for iterated hash f + (i.e., f 
Now we restate the statement of the lemma as follows.
). To prove that there exists above such i, we use the contradiction method. So assume that, for all i, it is not true. Therefore, for all 1
and so on. Thus we must have (h 0 , x 1 , · · · , x k ) = (h 0 , x 1 , · · · , x k ) which is not true. Hence the claim is proved by contradiction.
Recall that, H for any f . Since we usually choose a simply defined padding rule we can assume that we will be able to find efficiently a collision pair (M, M ) of the padding rule if it is not injective. Now we want to classify all padding rules such that MD hash functions based on these padding rule preserves collision security for any choice of initial value. Here we show that this class is nothing but the set of all suffix-free padding rules.
Theorem 1. Sufficient Condition for collision-preserving padding
If pad is suffix-free padding rule then given any collision pair (M, M ) for MD f pad we can construct a collision pair of f efficiently. Thus, MD f pad is preserving ( , )-collision security for any > 0.
Proof. Let pad(M ) = X and pad(M ) = X . Without loss of generality we assume that |X| ≤ |X |.
where both X and Y are members of ({0, 1} b ) k and X = Y (since pad is suffix-free and hence X is not a suffix of X ). Thus, by using the above basic lemma 1 we must have a collision for f in the computation of f 
Simple Examples of suffix-free Padding Rules
We would like to note that known padding rules such as Damgård's padding rule, Merkle's padding rule, Sarkar's padding rule are all suffix-free. Proposition 1. The padding rules pad merk , pad damg , and pad sarkar are suffix-free. Hence the MerkleDamgård hash function based on these padding rules preserves the collision security.
It is straightforward to verify and so we leave it for readers to verify. Recall that Damgård and Sarkar's padding rules have domain {0, 1}
* whereas the Merkle's padding rule has domain {0, 1} . So the number of padding bits for this padding rule is O(log |M |). Moreover, it can also be applied to arbitrary messages. Now we prove that it is a suffix-free padding rule. By using theorem 1, the MD hash function with this padding rule preserves collision security.
Lemma 2. The padding rule pad length is suffix-free.
Proof. Suppose pad length (M ) = (X, pad length (M )) for some X, M and M . Let us denote
Since pad length (M ) = (X, pad length (M )) we must have = and p i = p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ by comparing the positions of 1 and 0 bits. So, |M | = |M | and hence d = d . Thus, |pad length (M )| = |pad length (M )|. So, X = λ and pad length (M ) = pad length (M ) and hence M = M . This proves that pad length is suffix-free. Remark 1. Note that for any messages of size up to 2 63 the padding rule pad length with s = 64 is same as pad merk . So we can use Merkle's padding rule and for any message longer than 2 63 one can extend the definition by using pad length with s = 64. One may argue that the Merkle's padding rule is sufficient enough for all practical messages and the new padding rule only have of theoretical interest. However, in some applications (such as smart card) short messages appear more frequently (message sizes are usually less than 2 15 ). In those application, we can choose small value of s (such as 8 or 16). With this padding rule, we save at least 16 bit padding and as a result the hash function may be faster (since we can save sometimes one compression function invocation which is significant for short messages) than usual Merkle's padding rule. So, there are some applications where this padding rules are practically useful. Note that with s = 16, we can pad any message of arbitrary length. If we know beforehand that the message size can be large in some application, then s = 32 would be a reasonable choice. However, in most cases of message sizes, the later needs less number of padding bits.
A Necessary Condition for Collision-preserving Padding Rule
We have shown that any suffix-free property is good for collision-preserving. Now we show that it is also a necessary condition. To show this let us fix a padding rule pad which is not suffix-free. Therefore, we also fix M = M such that pad(M ) is a suffix of pad(M ). We can do so since we assume that padding rule is simply defined function and hence it must be easy to find such a pair. Now we first construct a compression function f given a collision secure compression function f (if there is no such then the question is moot) such that (M, M ) is a collision pair of H f pad . Then we prove that finding collision of f given M and M and the oracle f is as hard as finding collision of f . This proves that suffix-free padding rule is necessary to have a collision-preserving MD hash function for any compression function and for any initial value.
Theorem 2. Suffix-free is necessary condition Let pad be a fixed padding rule which is not suffix-free. Now, given a collision resistant compression function f there is a collision resistant compression function f such that the Merkle-Damgård hash function based on f with the padding rule pad is not collision resistant (by providing a collision pair of it).
Proof. Let us assume that there is a (t − 1)-bit collision resistant compression function f : {0, 1} b+t → {0, 1} t−1 , otherwise the question is moot. Without loss of generality, let the last bit of IV is 1. We have fixed a pair (M, M ) such that pad(M ) is a suffix of pad(M ). Let pad(M ) = (X, m) pad(M ), m ∈ {0, 1} b and X ∈ ({0, 1} b ) * . For simplicity we first assume that X = λ. Define
Thus, f (IV, m) = IV, a fixed point for f . Now it is easy to see that
. Now we have to show that f is collision resistant. Suppose there exists a collision finding algorithm A which finds collision for f . Let x = x such that f (x) = f (x ) where A returns the collision pair (x, x ). Now, it is easy to check that (x, x ) is a collision pair of f too. Since we do not know any collision algorithm for f , f must be collision resistant. Now consider the case where X ∈ ({0, 1} b ) + . We first define f (x) = f (x) 0 and compute IV = f + IV (X). Note that the last bit of IV is 0 and hence it is different from IV. Since f is a collision resistant compression function, IV should be different from all other intermediate values in the computation of f + IV (X). Otherwise, we will be able to find collision of f easily. We define . Now we show that the compression function f is also collision resistant. Suppose not, x = x and f (x) = f (x ) then clearly f (x) = f (x ) if x, x = IV m. Moreover x or x can not be IV m otherwise the last bits of f (x) and f (x ) will be different. Hence f is collision resistant as long as f is collision resistant. The collision pair (M, M ) also does not help to find a collision since M and M are efficiently computable and we can use M and M for any collision finding algorithm for f .
Is pad length optimum?
We have already shown that MD hash with a padding rule pad must be suffix-free to preserve the collision security property. We also have provided an example of suffix-free padding rule pad length which requires O(log |M |) bits. A natural question is to ask whether it is the optimum in terms of the padding bits. Let pad be any suffix-free padding rule and N i denotes the number of all messages which has i bits after applying the padding rule pad. In other words, N i = |pad −1 ({0, 1} i )|. By using the property that pad is suffix-free one can find the following relation:
If pad requires asymptotically d(n) bits for n-bit messages then n+d(n) j=1 N j ≥ 2 n . Using these two relations one may be able to show that d(n) ≥ log(n). However, we have no strong evident to claim that. We postulate this as a conjecture.
Conjecture: For any suffix-free padding rule pad : {0, 1} * → ({0, 1} b ) + , |pad(M )| ≥ |M | + log |M | for sufficiently large |M |.
